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Abstract 
 
In this study we have constructed a composite index of globalization of select Asian countries during 
1970-2014 by minimizing the Euclidean norm of Shapley values of indicator variables contributing to 
the overall index. As a consequence, the mean expected marginal contributions of constituent 
variables to the overall index are approximately equal and thus, the overall composite index 
represents the constituent variables optimally. We call this index the Almost Equal Marginal 
Contribution (AEMC) index. We find that AEMC index and the KOF index of globalization are highly 
correlated (Pearson’s r=0.982).  We find that Singapore, Cyprus, Israel, Qatar, Malaysia, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain and Japan have done very well and scored above 0.7. At the other 
end, Yemen, Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, Nepal and Myanmar have scored below 0.5. 
Trends in globalization are increasing in general, but the rate of globalization, which accelerated 
after 1991, lost is momentum after 2007. Disparities in globalization, as measured by Gini coefficient 
over the countries under study, were more or less constant up to 1985 but after that they started 
declining.   
We have found that the index of globalization goes well with other socio-economic measures such as 
Economic Freedom Index, International Innovation Index, Social Progress Index, Human 
Development Index and Corruption Perception Index, showing high values of Kendall’s Tau and 
Spearman’s Rho. Its association with Democracy Index is rather weak but positive. It is almost 
uncorrelated with the Gender Gap Index. We observe, therefore, that globalization index is moving 
well with the indices of socio-economic condition in the Asian countries.  
 
Key words: Globalization, synthetic index, Asian countries, Shapley values, Equi-marginal 
contribution. 
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1. Introduction: Asia is a continent of heterogeneous climate, geography, population, culture, 
religion and politico-economic systems. It has 50 nation states, population and area wise 
heterogeneous. It also includes several partially recognized countries with limited to no international 
recognition and no membership of the UN. On the one hand it has very large countries with over 1.3 
billion population such as China and India while on the other it has very small countries such as 
Bhutan, Maldives and Brunei with below million population. It has countries with very high 
population densities such as Maldives, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bahrain, and Bangladesh while it has 
countries like Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Bhutan and Oman with low population densities (Table-1). 
 
Table-1. Area, population, Density of Population, Net Migration and Urbanization in Asian Countries 
Country* Populn Density Area Migrn Urb Country* Populn Density Area Migrn Urb 
China 1409517 150 9388211 -339690 0.57 Azerbaijan 9828 119 82658 0 0.54 
India 1339180 450 2973190 -515643 0.32 Jordan 9702 109 88780 195057 0.68 
Indonesia 263991 146 1811570 -167000 0.53 Und. Arab Emir 9400 112 83600 96000 0.89 
Pakistan 197016 256 770880 -236384 0.38 Tajikistan 8921 64 139960 -20000 0.27 
Bangladesh 164670 1265 130170 -505297 0.35 Israel 8322 385 21640 3899 0.89 
Japan 127484 350 364555 71627 0.93 Hong Kong*  7365 7014 1050 14978 N.A. 
Philippines 104918 352 298170 -130000 0.44 Laos 6858 30 230800 -35498 0.41 
Viet Nam 95541 308 310070 -40000 0.34 Lebanon 6082 595 10230 250000 0.73 
Iran 81163 50 1628550 -80000 0.73 Kyrgyzstan 6045 32 191800 -27580 0.34 
Turkey 80745 105 769630 325434 0.71 Turkmenistan 5758 12 469930 -10000 0.48 
Thailand 69038 135 510890 33463 0.50 Singapore 5709 8155 700 67586 N.A. 
Myanmar 53371 82 653290 -94856 0.35 Palestine 4921 817 6020 -8750 0.72 
South Korea 50982 524 97230 33927 0.81 Oman 4636 15 309500 163500 0.73 
Iraq 38275 88 434320 92733 0.67 Kuwait 4137 232 17820 134000 0.87 
Afghanistan 35530 54 652860 89601 0.25 Georgia 3912 56 69490 -61054 0.59 
Saudi Arabia 32938 15 2149690 318000 0.77 Mongolia 3076 2 1553560 -3000 0.70 
Uzbekistan 31911 75 425400 -13294 0.34 Armenia 2930 103 28470 -6107 0.64 
Malaysia 31624 96 328550 156330 0.74 Qatar 2639 227 11610 120400 0.91 
Nepal 29305 204 143350 -74474 0.19 Bahrain 1493 1964 760 8400 0.82 
Yemen 28250 54 527970 -15002 0.33 Timor-Leste 1296 87 14870 -10001 0.31 
North Korea 25491 212 120410 -5403 0.61 Cyprus 1180 128 9240 4502 0.67 
Taiwan* 23626 667 35410 34000 0.77 Bhutan 808 21 38117 2000 0.38 
Sri Lanka 20877 333 62710 -96954 0.19 Macao* 623 20752 30 8470 0.95 
Syria 18270 99 183630 -831579 0.72 Maldives 436 1454 300 4383 0.39 
Kazakhstan 18204 7 2699700 31961 0.50 Brunei 429 81 5270 406 0.78 
Cambodia 16005 91 176520 -30000 0.21 Total 4504428 145.149 31033131 -1096909 0.48 
Note: Countries* = This table includes independent countries as well as dependencies. Population in 000 persons;  Area in Sq. Kilometres; Density in population per sq km;  Urb* 
= Unban population as % to total population; Migrn = Net migration No. of people  
 
2. Income and inequalities: In the economic realm, Asia is no less heterogeneous. Per capita income 
in Qatar is very high, making it the richest country in the world. The main source of income in Qatar 
is petroleum and gas which accounts for more than 70 percent of the Govt. revenue, more than 60 
percent of GDP and about 85 percent of the export earnings. Qatar has progressed towards 
establishing petrochemicals based industries along with steel and other construction materials. The 
second richest country (as to per capita GDP, see Table-2) is Singapore, a conglomeration of almost 
completely urbanized small islands, considered as a global commerce, finance and transport hub. Its 
standings include: the most "technology-ready" nation, top International-meetings city, the city with 
"best investment potential" on account of being a ‘tax heaven’, second-most competitive country, 
third-largest foreign exchange market, third-largest financial centre, third-largest oil refining and 
trading centre and the second-busiest container port (Wikipedia: Singapore).  The third in the list is 
Brunei, an industrialised country that amassed wealth from extensive petroleum and natural gas 
fields. It has very high Human Development Index (among the Southeast Asian nations) and is 
classified as a "developed country". Brunei is not a democratic country. Its political system is 
governed by the constitution and the national tradition of the Malay Islamic Monarchy (Wikipedia: 
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Brunei). Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and Japan are other rich countries. However, on the 
bottom side of the list, there are several poor countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Nepal and Yemen with per capita income less than Int$4000.    
 
Table-2. Select  Asian countries by GDP(PPP) per capita (in Int$) 
SL# Country GDP_PC SL# Country GDP_PC SL# Country GDP_PC 
1 Qatar 127660 14 Russian_Fed. 26490 27 Armenia 8621 
2 Singapore 87855 15 Kazakhstan 25145 28 Bhutan 8227 
3 Brunei 76884 16 Turkey 24912 29 Philippines 7728 
4 Kuwait 71887 17 Lebanon 18525 30 India 6616 
5 United_Arab 67871 18 Iran_Isl_Rep. 18077 31 Vietnam 6429 
6 Saudi_Arabia 55158 19 Azerbaijan 17439 32 Myanmar 5832 
7 Bahrain 50704 20 Thailand 16888 33 Pakistan 5106 
8 Oman 46698 21 China 15399 34 Bangladesh 3891 
9 Japan 41275 22 Jordan 12278 35 Cambodia 3737 
10 Korea_Rep. 37740 23 Mongolia 12275 36 Kyrgyzstan 3521 
11 Israel 35179 24 Sri Lanka 12262 37 Tajikistan 3008 
12 Cyprus 34970 25 Indonesia 11720 38 Nepal 2479 
13 Malaysia 27267 26 Georgia 10044 39 Yemen 2375 
. 
Table-3. Income Inequality in Select Asian Countries as measured by Gini Coefficient 
Country Gini Coeff Year Country Gini Coeff Year Country Gini Coeff Year 
Malaysia 46.26 2009 Sri Lanka 38.58 2012 Japan 32.11 2008 
Philippines 43.04 2012 Iran 37.35 2013 Bangladesh 31.98 2010 
Israel 42.78 2010 Yemen 35.89 2005 Armenia 31.54 2013 
China 42.06 2010 Arab Rep 35.77 2004 Tajikistan 30.77 2009 
Russia 41.59 2012 Indonesia 35.57 2010 Cambodia 30.76 2012 
Turkey 40.17 2012 Cyprus 34.31 2012 Pakistan 29.59 2010 
Georgia 40.03 2013 India 33.90 2009 Kyrgyzstan 27.37 2012 
Thailand 39.26 2012 Mongolia 33.75 2012 Kazakhstan 26.35 2013 
Vietnam 38.70 2012 Jordan 33.66 2010 Azerbaijan 16.64 2005 
Bhutan 38.65 2012 Nepal 32.75 2010 Median Gini 34.31 2012 
Source: https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings 
. 
Table-4. Population living below national Poverty Line IN Select Asian Countries 
SL# Country % Ppn Year SL# Country % Ppn Year SL# Country 
% 
 Ppn 
Year 
1 Tajikistan 46.7 2009 10 India 22 2015 19 Indonesia 12.5 2011 
2 Yemen 34.8 2005 11 Bangladesh 18.5 2010 20 Sri Lanka 8.9 2010 
3 Kyrgyzstan 33.7 2010 12 Turkey 18.1 2009 21 Kazakhstan 8.2 2009 
4 Cambodia 30.1 2007 13 Georgia 17.7 2011 22 Azerbaijan 7.6 2011 
5 Mongolia 27.4 2012 14 Pakistan 17.2 2006 23 Malaysia 3.8 2009 
6 Nepal 25.2 2011 15 Vietnam 17.2 2012 
- 
Estimated with % Pn Living under 
$3.10 a day (Not Poverty Line) 7 Philippines 25.2 2012 16 Jordan 14.4 2010 
8 Bhutan 23.2 2007 17 Thailand 13.2 2011 24 China 2.5 2013 
9 Armenia 22.6 1995 18 Russia 12.7 2011 25 Iran 1 2013 
(1). Data not available for other countries under study. (2) Source - Wikipedia: List of countries by percentage of 
population living in poverty   
 
Nevertheless, high per capita income at the country level does not imply the well-being of people in 
the lower income brackets. Although much quantitative information is not available on the income 
distribution in all Asian countries, telling inequalities are pervasive. It is reported that Qatar's income 
per person is among the World's highest. But income is unequally distributed: the richest Qataris 
receive over 13 times as much as the poorest (The economist, 2011). Singapore has acute 
inequalities. It is reported (The Economist, 2015) that as measured by Gini coefficient, Singapore is 
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among the world’s most unequal countries, although the figure may not be fully comparable with 
those of the other countries because of the facts that first, Singapore is almost wholly urban, 
secondly that the inequalities are computed there by excluding shorter-term foreign workers and 
non-working families and lastly that income includes employers’ CPF contributions also, which are 
capped for higher-paid workers. If the Gini coefficient for Singapore is adjusted for these factors, it 
could be lesser in magnitude.  Interestingly, elsewhere (States Times Review, 2017) we find that 
Singapore has the Gini coefficient 0.458 in 2016. In that case it is comparable to Malysia (Table-3) 
unless income inequality figure for Malaysia has dropped since 2009 or the statistics are not much 
reliable for either country.   For Brunei it is reported (Reddit.com, 2014) that the level of inequality in 
household income distribution has dropped significantly over the last two decades. The Gini 
coefficient value decreased from 0.534 in 1987-1988 to 0.413 in 1997-1998 and to 0.355 in 2005. 
The share of income for 40 per cent of the poorest households increased from 11.3 per cent in 1997-
1998 to 14.6 per cent in 1997-1998 and to 17.4 per cent in 2005. The share of income for 40 per cent 
of middle-income households also increased from 29.6 per cent to 37.2 per cent and to 40.7 per cent 
in the same years. In line with the increase, the share of income for the 40 per cent of the richest 
households has decreased over the period. In Hong Kong it is reported that in 2011 the Gini 
coefficient of income distribution was as high as 0.537 (Wikipedia: List of countries by income 
equality) and according to the UN estimate the ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the 
poorest 10% was 17.8 while the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% 
was 9.7. It is also important to look into the statistics on poverty (Table-4). In the countries such as 
Tajikistan, Yemen and Kyrgyzstan over 1/3
rd
 of the population lives below poverty line as defined by 
the respective countries.    
3. GDP growth rate: In Table-5 we present the countries under study in a descending order of 
growth rate in the real GDP (2016). While the leading countries are Nepal, India, Bangladesh, 
Thailand, Philippines, China, etc., the trailing countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Brunei and 
Yemen. However, it may be pointed out that GDP growth rates are very volatile and little reliable 
indicators. Most of the countries in Asia have a large income from agriculture sector that depends on 
vagaries of nature. They also have a large unorganized (or informal) sector in manufacturing and 
service sectors. Moreover, the reliability of real GDP statistics depends on accuracy of accounting 
and this accuracy depends on the level of development of a country. Underdeveloped economies 
are generally poor at accounting.   Morgenstern (1962) referring to Kuznets remarks that average 
error in income (GDP) estimates could not be less than 10 percent (in case of USA, a developed 
country). While error in basic manufacturing and public utilities sector could be less than 10 percent, 
in agriculture, mining, trade, banking, insurance, etc. it could be between 10 to 30 percent and in the 
sectors such as direct services, construction, real estate, etc. error could be above 30 percent. As to 
growth rates of GDP over the years, say t0 and t1,  the range [min(Y1)/max(Y0)] and [max(Y1)/min(Y0)], 
where Y0 and Y1 are the income figures for the years t0 and t1 respectively, would determine the 
range in which the income ratios of the two years would lie. To illustrate, suppose in t0 GDP is 
$100±10 and in t1 it is $110±10. Then growth rate will lie between (100/110-1) and (120/90-1) or -
9.09 ≤ g ≤ 33.33 percent.  Furthermore, different countries have different ways to estimate their 
GDP. In this regard it is pertinent to consider the observation made by Morgenstern (1962, p. 42): 
“International comparisons are constantly being made. .... Yet we need only to look at numerous 
United Nations publications to see that this is being done for the whole world without any further 
excuse. The most startling use - or rather abuse - is for determining allegedly comparable growth 
rates for different countries, on the basis of which far-reaching policy decisions are made.”  
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Secondly, the growth rates in GDP are indicative of neither development nor welfare. Most of the 
rich/developed countries, which also have better welfare status of their people, have low real GDP 
growth rate. Some examples are: Sweden and Netherland have 3.30% real GDP  growth rate (in 
2016) and the countries such as Germany, U.K., U.S., Canada, Belgium, France, Denmark, Japan and 
Norway  have 1.8% Real GDP growth rate or even less than that. 
Table-5. Select  Asian countries by GDP Growth Rate in the Year 2016 
Sl# Country RGDPGR Sl# Country RGDPGR Sl# Country RGDPGR 
1 Nepal 7.56 14 Pakistan 4.71 27 Jordan 2.1 
2 India 7.1 15 Sri Lanka 4.3 28 Singapore 2 
3 Bangladesh 6.92 16 Malaysia 4.2 29 Kyrgyzstan 2 
4 Thailand 6.9 17 Israel 4 30 Saudi_Arabia 1.4 
5 Philippines 6.8 18 Bahrain 4 31 Tajikistan 1.4 
6 China 6.7 19 Oman 4 32 Kazakhstan 1.1 
7 Iran 6.54 20 Turkey 3.2 33 Lebanon 1 
8 Bhutan 6.5 21 United_Arab 2.9 34 Japan 1 
9 Vietnam 6.4 22 Cyprus 2.8 35 Armenia 0.2 
10 Myanmar 6.3 23 Korea_Rep. 2.8 36 Azerbaijan 0 
11 Mongolia 5.5 24 Qatar 2.7 37 Russian_Fed. -0.2 
12 Cambodia 5.5 25 Georgia 2.7 38 Brunei -1.2 
13 Indonesia 5 26 Kuwait 2.5 39 Yemen. -28.1 
 
Whatever be the status of economic prosperity of a few rich countries in Asia that have geological 
fortune and location advantages, they jointly house not more than 2.5 or at most 3 percent of total 
population in Asia.  Other countries have to prosper by being industrious as well as by exploitation of 
comparative advantages. Some counties have exhibited such efforts and hence Japan, Israel, South 
Korea and Russia have developed and, China, Philippines, Cyprus, Turkey, India, Thailand, Vietnam, 
etc. have made significant progress. On the other hand, there are many countries yet to make any 
significant headway to fast economic development.   
 
4. Issues in economic development of Asian countries: Economic development is based on four 
fundaments: (1) availability of natural resources, (2) availability of physical, financial and human 
capital, (3) technology and innovativeness, and (4) favourable institutions. Most of the development 
theories have stressed on the one or the other fundamental, undermining the role of the other 
fundamentals, taking them for granted.  It may be noted that, first of all, many less developed 
countries may not have abundant natural resource and secondly, even if they have, they may simply 
export them without developing any processing industries or the industries that have strong 
backward linkage to the available resources. This is because the rest of the three fundamental 
factors may not lend support to development of such industries. 
 
The theories that stress on physical/financial capital suggest to enhancing domestic savings or 
permitting foreign capital to flow in either by way of loan or investment. It is assumed that the 
investment would be made to utilize natural resources in accordance with the comparative 
advantage. It is also assumed that technology and skilled manpower to apply that technology would 
readily be available and institutions are all favourable to allow the capital/investment to operate 
with considerably high efficiency.  However, there are catches in the logic. Inflow of foreign capital 
to the less developed countries is constrained, which is known as the Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990) 
and Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980; Alfaro et al. 2005), due to uncertainties 
as well as issues such as technological incoherence, unavailability of infrastructure and human 
resources, institutional factors and government policies at the destination countries. This has been 
widely experienced in African as well as in Asian countries. In absence of inflow of foreign capital, 
domestic savings and investment become highly correlated. When income is low, efforts to raise 
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domestic savings by curtaining consumption may adversely affect human capital and its efficiency 
(Myrdal, 1972: p. 54) offsetting the benefits of investment based on domestic savings. This 
interlocking is difficult to break.  
 
Financing development activities through borrowing from the international organizations also has 
not borne much fruit except that the burden of debt kept on escalating over time. It created a sort of 
dependency on financers, dictating the path of development a country could choose. It is well 
known how India had to go in for reforms and restructuring in 1991 (Mishra and Kumar, 1913).     
Technology is relatively easy to bring in, but the management and the availability of skilled human 
resources to adopt the technology to its full efficiency are constrained by other factors. Such 
technologies are also capital intensive and it has its bearing on the low level technology prevailing in 
the less developed countries. This brings about social dissatisfaction and political resistance. 
Education system is not in coordination with the technologically modern industrial requirements, 
nor is it easy to restructure education system on account of unavailability of trained manpower.  
Hence, educational expansion is often leading to deterioration of quality and further divergence 
from the industrial requirements. Innovativeness is choked by social circumstances, unsupportive 
government policies, unavailability of institutional finance, poor infrastructure and uncertainty of 
market conditions. As to human capital, literacy and education is quality-wise poor and unhelpful in 
imparting skill and employability, not to mention an ability to carry out critical evaluation. The 
intelligentsia is either incapable or indifferent, if not opportunistic or supporting the coalition 
(Rudra, 1989) that thrives on the mass poverty and perpetual underdevelopment. Due to poor 
health infrastructure, deplorable sanitation facilities, deficient waste disposal system and poverty a 
large part of the population also has poor health conditions.    
Many Asian countries (such as Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Yemen, Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Oman, 
Kazakhstan, China, Qatar, Russia, Vietnam, Kuwait, Armenia, and Jordan) are authoritarian.  Some of 
them (such as Pakistan, Lebanon, Thailand, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Bangladesh and Georgia) are 
hybrid regimes (hybrids of authoritarian and corrupt democracies) where consequential 
irregularities exist in elections regularly preventing them from being free and fair, where 
governments apply pressure on political opponents, judiciaries work under govt. pressure, where 
there is  widespread corruption, media are not permitted to act independently, political culture is 
underdeveloped, and there are issues in the functioning of governance. Only a few (Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, India, Israel, South Korea) are 
democracies, although flawed democracies.  Flawed democracies are nations where elections are 
fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom 
infringement). Nonetheless, these nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, 
including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the 
functioning of governance (The Economist, 2015). Most of the Asian countries are ‘soft state’ of 
Gunnar Myrdal whether the Asian countries hate, like or exhibit an indifference to that qualification. 
These countries, observes Myrdal (Myrdal, 1970, p. 211), cannot impose the right development 
policies. Soft state signifies a country wherein the various types of social indiscipline which manifest 
themselves by deficiencies in legislation and, in particular, law observance and enforcement, a 
widespread disobedience by public officials and, often, their collusion with powerful persons and 
groups. It also refers to widespread practices of rent-seeking and corruption not taken much 
seriously or pro-actively by the society, administration or even the legal system. Their political 
system is often corrupt, or it supports corruption and is unwilling to act against corruption at all 
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levels. This state may be attributable to the past colonial rule and the vacuum created by their 
departure which could not properly be filled afterwards due to many reasons including vested 
interests. This was also due to the persistence, even after independence, of an attitude of 
disobedience to any authority which was historically central to the nationalist politics against the 
colonial powers. These observations of Myrdal are often overlooked. As Maharatna (2010) opines, it 
is “a misfortune that the notion of ‘soft state’ as pioneered by Gunnar Myrdal had received at its 
advent unduly harsh and certainly very hasty criticisms from the then influential scholars and 
political leaders of India and elsewhere. Consequently, profusely insightful and useful suggestions 
and advices emanating from the Asian Drama, particularly towards a more effective functioning of 
the state, had been summarily flouted by the then dominant leaderships and governments—albeit 
at colossal peril of many countries’ subsequent development trajectories. Similarly costly should 
have been the callous neglect and indifference on the part of academics and political leaders alike 
towards Myrdal’s incisive analysis and understanding of the growing phenomenon of corruption in 
many newly independent countries in Asia.” Overall, most of the Asian countries have deficient 
social capital (Putnam, 1995; 2000). It is important to note that social capital can neither be 
borrowed nor imported. It cannot easily be cultivated due its complexity, non-material nature and 
its being housed in the mind of the people or the social psyche (obshchestvennaia psikhika) that 
regulates people’s attitudes and conducts often without their being conscious of its influence. 
5. Recent thrust to development through globalization: After the dissolution of the USSR, many 
countries in Asia resolved to try with ‘globalization-led development’ (Mishra, 1917a). This is partly 
because ‘planning-led development’ or ‘borrowing-led’ development did not bear much fruit for 
several decades. In the globalization program the economic part relates to promoting the flow of 
goods and services, financial resources and investment across the national borders and reduction in 
restrictions on such flow by means of tariff, taxes and other barriers.  The social part of the 
globalization is concerned with movement people, information, ideas and culture and connecting 
the people across the national boundaries. To facilitate these two types of flows and to reduce 
restriction on them, it is required that necessary political connectivity and functionality should be 
there for which embassies, membership in international organizations, international treaties, etc. 
are needed. It is expected that while economic part would stimulate flow of goods, services, finance, 
capital and technologies in which sphere decision-making will not be limited on the basis of 
nationality. The socio-cultural aspect of globalization would inculcate modernization ideals, 
innovativeness, openness of mind, awareness to opportunities, cosmopolitanism and knowledge 
capital as well as it would reduce many biases that are caused by a closed mindset.  
 
It is not that such flow of goods, finance, capital, technology, people, ideas, culture, etc. was not 
there before 1991.  Colonization of the countries in Africa, Asia and elsewhere did connect the 
colonized countries for transfer of material resource, technologies, people, ideas and culture. 
However, the motive force of establishing such connections and transfers were exploitation and 
imperialism rather than development. Moreover, such transfers were not based on a wilful 
exchange among the parties. After the Second World War, when many colonies became sovereign 
states, such interactions were there. By way of exports and imports goods crossed boundaries. Ideas 
and innovations originating in developed countries did percolate to less developed countries. 
Technology transfers and adaptations did take place. Yet, such interactions were not considered as 
an engine of growth or development.   
 
After the fall of the USSR, the 3-Worlds picture was reduced to the 2-Worlds picture in which there 
are developed countries and underdeveloped (developing) countries, most of them managing their 
economies on the market principle. Now, development of underdeveloped countries is not a ‘white 
man’s burden’, but a transformation based on wilful exchange among the parties involved that may 
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turn out to be in the interest of all the parties. Development (economic, social and political) of the 
Asian, African or Latin American countries is necessary for the developed countries so that the 
capital of the latter finds destinations where they can be more productive (and overcome Lucas 
paradox) as well as the market for the products that the latter produces. This development is 
necessary for the developed countries so that their capital finds natural as well as human resources 
cheaper to operate upon, beyond their own national boundaries and they also find the markets to 
dispose the produce off, beyond their own national boundaries, and bring home only the profits.  
The underdeveloped countries are interested in such a program because they have failed to find 
enough capital (at home or borrowed from elsewhere), entrepreneurs and skilful management to 
operate on their natural resources for generating sufficient income and employment  in order to 
bring themselves out of the vicious circle of underdevelopment. It is also expected that such an 
arrangement would transform the domestic business environment in the underdeveloped countries.     
6. Measurement of the degree of globalization: A number of indices have been devised that may be 
used to assess the extent of globalization of different countries and also study the trends in 
globalization over time. Since globalization is a multifaceted concept, such indices of globalization 
are often obtained by a weighted aggregation of several indicators of globalization in different 
dimensions.  Samimi (2011) reviews a number of such indices among which Vujakovic (2010) and 
KOF (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008) indices of globalization are noteworthy.  
The KOF index of globalization has been constructed for many countries for 45 years (1970-2014) on 
an annual basis and, thus, greatly facilitating a study on the trends of globalization for a large 
number of countries.   It visualizes three aspects of globalization; economic, social and political. The 
economic dimension (E) of globalization takes into account: (1). E1 - actual economic flows such as 
trans-border trade, direct investment and portfolio investment, and (2). E2 - restrictions on trans-
border trade as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc. They are synthesized to 
make E. The social dimension (S) takes into account: (1) S1 - trans-border personal contacts such as 
degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, etc., (2) S2 - flow of information, and (3). S3 - 
cultural proximity. They are synthesized to make S. The political dimension has only one aspect, P. At 
the second stage, E, S and P are synthesized (by a weighted aggregation) to give the KOF Index of 
globalization (Mishra, 2017b).  
However, the enterprise of construction of composite indices by a weighted aggregation of 
indicators in varied dimensions is vexed with the problem of choice of weights to be assigned to 
different indicator variables. When weights are assigned subjectively (based on expert opinion) it 
faces the criticism of inducing subjective biases. Yet, when weights are assigned by any so-called 
objective method (that derives them from the data itself through some statistical/mathematical 
method) they may not fall in line with the pre-conceived (theoretically sound or otherwise) notion of 
importance that the analyst holds.  Even if the importance of different indicators assessed by the 
analyst is correct, it is not necessary that the data and the method that operates on them to derive 
weights would fulfil the expectations of the analyst. The reasons for this divergence are varied. Data 
are the figures emanating from facts. Data are collected by following some concepts and they are 
constrained by many factors. There can be a great gap between concepts and facts. Of what sort and 
how much of information on facts, filtered by what sort of precepts, gets converted to quantitative 
data ultimately determines the extent to which figures can stand for facts.   
Popularly, different indicators are assigned weights such that they are some function of Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient or covariance among different indicator variables.  The Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) is based on such correlation (or covariance). It maximizes the Euclidean norm of 
correlation coefficients between the composite index and the indicator variables. On this account 
two questions can be raised; first how to measure correlation, and the second why the Euclidean 
norm?  There are many measures of correlation including Pearsonian correlation, Bradley’s absolute 
8 
 
correlation, Spearman’s rank correlation and so on up to Szekely’s Distance (Brownian) correlation 
(Mishra, 1914). Similarly, among the many possible norms, one may choose absolute, Euclidean or 
Chebyshev norm. Accordingly, the composite index would vary.  
There are other two methods that deserve mention here. The first of them is Pena’s method 
(Somarriba and Pena, 2009) and the second is the one proposed by Becker et al. (2017). Pena’s 
method sequentially finds the explanatory power (R2) of each leading indicator variable net of the 
other trailing indicator variables and assigns weights to the indicator variables accordingly. Becker et 
al. (2017) use the correlation ratios and optimize its function to obtain weights.  
Table-6. Different Dimensions and Synthetic Indices of Globalization in Select Asian Countries 
Country Year* E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Singapore 2009 99.01 95.35 92.18 88.25 96.12 71.77 88.27 88.27 
Cyprus 2008 93.50 84.06 88.10 95.69 93.84 78.36 87.32 86.04466 
Israel 2010 71.59 83.51 75.06 67.25 90.37 80.29 78.15 80.09249 
Qatar 2014 77.52 84.43 78.83 72.34 89.65 72.57 78.49 79.1897 
Malaysia 2010 89.03 69.62 64.71 75.92 87.52 83.17 79.12 77.38491 
Jordan 2005 80.57 60.04 68.99 67.45 40.71 84.27 70.17 72.86044 
Lebanon 2006 86.92 62.30 70.38 81.04 43.26 74.55 70.50 71.16785 
Turkey 2014 51.09 66.13 50.76 72.49 81.59 91.88 71.33 70.66232 
Kuwait 2009 59.15 77.58 79.06 76.88 90.41 59.79 70.99 70.34469 
Bahrain 2007 95.39 82.72 87.67 69.57 43.66 43.80 67.85 70.3223 
Japan 2014 50.41 76.54 43.39 75.59 87.91 88.10 72.26 70.15894 
Saudi_Arabia 1993 48.19 76.19 71.10 29.62 75.95 71.77 62.50 70.13246 
Thailand 2012 83.87 59.54 42.90 72.93 80.93 81.22 72.06 67.57002 
Brune 2014 75.84 81.56 72.23 84.52 43.51 54.05 67.60 67.20363 
Korea_Rep. 2014 62.52 63.76 43.81 73.55 42.42 89.58 67.03 66.91502 
Russian_Fed. 2013 61.73 45.75 43.65 73.80 81.93 91.62 68.88 65.27114 
Georgia 2013 78.44 85.96 56.84 75.82 39.20 49.37 64.21 62.73205 
Oman 2014 78.55 82.90 59.43 72.22 39.42 45.74 62.66 61.32702 
Indonesia 2014 56.25 71.79 20.40 49.92 33.89 86.83 59.65 60.54658 
Armenia 2014 64.89 71.54 48.41 77.23 1.68 66.99 58.89 59.72001 
Kazakhstan 2012 81.17 54.03 53.77 70.97 1.86 68.59 58.97 59.67099 
Philippines 2004 65.02 58.69 31.13 49.26 39.90 81.03 59.20 59.47478 
China 2014 43.49 62.19 18.71 65.65 78.37 84.26 62.02 57.46764 
Kyrgyzstan 2013 65.70 61.89 39.43 75.43 2.48 65.90 55.79 54.82688 
Mongolia 2014 84.88 65.73 16.76 59.40 1.43 71.89 56.91 54.78246 
Azerbaijan 2013 58.58 64.16 38.63 78.75 35.07 60.22 57.50 53.84511 
Pakistan 2002 29.82 50.40 31.51 41.45 32.38 84.27 50.65 53.50246 
Sri Lanka 2007 47.08 46.86 35.64 54.40 33.50 74.53 52.60 52.51512 
India 2014 43.78 44.93 14.10 45.12 32.98 91.23 52.38 52.26477 
Vietnam 2014 80.26 49.28 16.43 63.78 31.92 71.13 56.69 51.4205 
Cambodia 2014 85.86 50.76 29.52 48.48 1.31 62.36 50.69 50.98426 
United_Arab 2011 53.48 55.43 51.94 65.49 1.00 52.73 48.93 49.79375 
Yemen 2009 46.31 63.83 25.35 42.40 1.31 64.78 46.15 48.55389 
Tajikistan 2012 42.12 57.24 26.44 53.65 1.00 61.87 45.26 45.55294 
Bangladesh 2013 29.79 41.19 25.78 42.07 1.56 76.18 42.43 45.12315 
Bhutan 2014 60.64 56.77 46.83 45.54 6.87 38.85 43.58 44.96274 
Iran 2013 25.33 34.55 29.99 69.07 1.12 67.69 42.35 40.79011 
Nepal 2013 13.26 39.95 24.97 44.85 2.79 70.69 38.18 40.36511 
Myanmar 2014 56.93 56.33 11.89 42.07 1.00 44.74 39.03 37.29294 
Year* = Year in the span 1970-2014 for which AEMC obtains largest value representing highest globalization attained 
7. The present study: In this study we construct a composite index of globalization by a method 
proposed by Mishra (2016). It obtains weights for indicator variables such that the Euclidean norm of 
their Shapley values in explaining the composite index is minimized. Thus we get almost ‘equi-
marginal contribution’ solution of weights to construct the composite index. Shapley values (that 
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have uniqueness, efficiency, symmetry, linearity and anonymity properties) are mean expected 
marginal contributions to the value of a coalition game (Roth, 1988).  
Table-7. Shapley Value of Constituent Variables in KOF and AEMC Indices and their Euclidean Norm  
Globalization Aspect E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P Norm 
Shapley Value (KOF) 0.17952 0.15176 0.11351 0.21295 0.19581 0.14613 0.41616 
Shapley Value (AEMC) 0.16556 0.16578 0.16584 0.17065 0.16612 0.16605 0.40827 
AEMC Weights 0.33639 0.52417 0.67645 0.00186 0.15866 0.82650 - 
We have used the indicators of different dimensions of globalization from the KOF study-1917: 
economic (E1 and E2), social (S1, S2 and S3) and political (P) for 45 years, 1970 through 2014, and for 
39 countries in Asia. For some Asian countries, data were deficient and thus such countries were 
dropped out from our analysis. Unlike the KOF study that constructs the composite index at two 
stages (at the first stage making E from E1 and E2, S from S1, S2 and S3 and then at the second stage 
obtaining the final index by synthesizing E, S and P), we have synthesized  E1, E2, S1, S2, S3 and P at 
one go. It may be noted that in making the index at two stages, we lose the information content of 
EiSj, PSi and PEi. After all, economic, social and political indicators are not orthogonal to each other. 
The main findings of our study are presented in Table-6 and Table-7. In Table-6 we present values of 
E1 through P, the KOF index and the best value of AEMC indices of globalization in 1970-2014. In 
Table-7 we present the Shapley values obtained by the constituent variables (E1, E2, S1, S2, S3 and 
P) for the Almost Equi-marginal Contribution (AEMC) index and their Euclidean norm. For 
comparison the corresponding Shapley values and their Euclidean norm for the KOF index of 
globalization also are presented. We observe that the AEMC norm is a little less than the KOF norm 
and the Shapley values for the former are more equitably distributed than those of the latter. The 
weights obtained by S2 (flow of information) is the least although its Shapley value is the largest 
(0.17065). On the other hand, although P (political dimension) gets the largest weight, its Shapley 
value is comparable to others.  
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8. Trends in growth and disparities in globalization: Over the years since 1970, the mean level of 
globalization in Asian countries has increased. Its growth rate accelerated after 1991 but started 
tapering off since 2007 or so. Disparities in globalization over the Asian countries were more or less 
constant up to 1985 but after that they started declining (vide Fig-1 and Table-8). We have measured 
disparities by the Gini coefficient (scaled up to lie between zero and 100).  
Table-8. Trends in the Measures of Globalization in Asian Countries – 1970-2014 
Year 
Gini Cefficient (Per Cent) Over Countries of Measures Arithmetic Mean Over Countries of Measures 
ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC 
1970 25.839 32.772 22.914 19.542 21.283 35.082 24.364 31.081 30.022 31.906 
1971 28.603 34.061 25.074 21.137 22.468 37.809 26.704 29.847 31.514 33.391 
1972 28.372 34.181 24.616 20.891 22.179 37.646 26.635 30.714 31.669 33.640 
1973 28.950 34.352 23.156 20.908 22.166 38.448 26.564 33.149 32.598 34.704 
1974 28.503 34.547 22.237 20.210 21.274 38.597 26.497 35.143 33.176 35.462 
1975 28.489 34.841 22.739 20.904 22.151 38.813 26.389 35.627 33.348 35.680 
1976 28.400 34.812 22.678 20.712 21.879 38.854 26.498 37.101 33.809 36.246 
1977 28.233 34.806 22.586 20.658 21.827 38.904 26.599 38.115 34.142 36.641 
1978 28.542 35.944 21.529 20.632 21.436 38.988 27.146 39.513 34.761 37.271 
1979 27.841 36.312 20.760 20.351 20.955 38.806 27.367 40.695 35.104 37.507 
1980 28.065 36.310 19.367 20.859 21.731 39.365 27.426 39.526 35.002 37.230 
1981 27.686 35.392 19.004 20.873 21.732 40.176 27.840 39.547 35.448 37.675 
1982 27.499 35.270 18.481 20.967 21.699 40.530 28.336 39.465 35.734 37.886 
1983 27.525 35.327 19.815 21.782 22.513 40.491 28.984 39.565 35.988 38.052 
1984 27.177 36.198 22.203 21.910 22.538 41.463 30.747 38.907 36.802 38.677 
1985 26.866 35.678 21.307 21.199 21.754 41.822 31.310 40.108 37.470 39.332 
1986 26.946 35.612 20.840 21.235 21.780 41.832 31.651 40.411 37.681 39.464 
1987 26.479 35.814 19.887 21.150 21.737 42.084 31.666 39.650 37.566 39.228 
1988 26.060 35.296 22.033 20.423 20.815 42.507 32.054 41.123 38.266 39.993 
1989 25.400 35.127 22.669 20.489 21.130 43.168 32.206 41.963 38.788 40.532 
1990 25.346 33.719 22.154 19.729 20.299 42.928 32.783 43.384 39.308 40.995 
1991 22.880 31.524 28.741 19.576 20.268 44.213 32.630 41.810 39.273 41.035 
1992 21.593 31.910 26.853 19.361 19.610 44.787 33.318 45.502 40.749 42.686 
1993 20.840 32.201 26.353 19.173 19.323 45.480 34.395 48.593 42.246 44.307 
1994 20.324 32.507 25.953 18.688 18.617 46.419 35.730 49.326 43.273 45.174 
1995 19.849 31.466 24.239 17.905 17.762 47.512 37.027 49.696 44.243 45.834 
1996 19.590 30.685 23.808 17.871 17.596 49.009 39.053 50.702 45.801 47.043 
1997 19.002 30.184 23.026 17.626 17.405 50.889 40.566 51.840 47.339 48.221 
1998 18.177 28.410 21.940 17.071 17.044 52.008 42.237 51.989 48.395 48.725 
1999 17.594 26.907 21.428 16.226 16.416 53.752 43.844 53.463 50.015 50.113 
2000 16.898 25.710 21.154 15.467 15.939 55.974 45.314 55.336 51.862 51.664 
2001 15.523 25.743 20.912 14.998 15.272 55.840 46.552 56.538 52.603 52.124 
2002 15.113 25.136 20.234 14.393 14.643 55.824 47.075 57.613 53.087 52.563 
2003 15.155 25.239 18.966 14.200 14.258 56.513 46.913 59.084 53.677 53.352 
2004 15.494 24.571 18.981 14.199 14.465 58.116 47.827 59.644 54.738 54.414 
2005 14.953 24.239 18.122 13.576 13.632 59.436 48.141 60.607 55.589 55.256 
2006 14.388 23.512 16.727 13.069 13.123 60.130 49.216 63.183 56.942 56.497 
2007 14.964 23.653 15.577 13.567 13.654 60.512 49.926 65.209 57.899 57.338 
2008 15.438 23.629 14.196 13.317 13.391 59.692 49.892 67.282 58.166 57.755 
2009 15.502 23.384 13.908 13.300 13.296 59.921 49.927 67.900 58.431 58.000 
2010 15.521 23.086 13.824 12.997 13.100 60.751 50.316 68.286 58.975 58.313 
2011 15.512 22.592 13.833 12.516 12.571 60.298 50.301 68.078 58.753 57.911 
2012 14.793 22.495 13.017 12.061 11.910 60.887 50.552 69.203 59.364 58.571 
2013 14.249 22.866 13.116 12.092 11.863 61.421 50.876 68.825 59.568 58.607 
2014 14.832 22.352 12.051 11.809 11.647 62.082 51.131 69.523 60.091 59.077 
. 
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. 
Table-9. Trends in Dispersion (Absolute Distance) of Globalization in Asian Countries – 1970-2014 
Year ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC Year ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC 
1970 9.065 7.985 7.122 5.867 6.791 1993 9.478 11.076 12.806 8.100 8.561 
1971 10.814 9.096 7.484 6.661 7.502 1994 9.434 11.615 12.802 8.087 8.410 
1972 10.681 9.104 7.561 6.616 7.461 1995 9.431 11.651 12.046 7.922 8.141 
1973 11.131 9.125 7.676 6.816 7.693 1996 9.601 11.983 12.071 8.185 8.278 
1974 11.001 9.154 7.815 6.705 7.544 1997 9.670 12.245 11.937 8.344 8.393 
1975 11.057 9.194 8.101 6.971 7.903 1998 9.454 12.000 11.406 8.261 8.305 
1976 11.035 9.224 8.414 7.003 7.930 1999 9.457 11.797 11.456 8.115 8.227 
1977 10.984 9.258 8.608 7.053 7.998 2000 9.459 11.650 11.706 8.021 8.235 
1978 11.128 9.757 8.507 7.172 7.989 2001 8.668 11.984 11.823 7.890 7.960 
1979 10.804 9.938 8.448 7.144 7.860 2002 8.437 11.833 11.657 7.641 7.697 
1980 11.048 9.958 7.655 7.301 8.091 2003 8.564 11.840 11.206 7.622 7.607 
1981 11.123 9.853 7.516 7.399 8.188 2004 9.005 11.751 11.321 7.772 7.871 
1982 11.145 9.994 7.293 7.493 8.221 2005 8.888 11.669 10.983 7.547 7.532 
1983 11.145 10.239 7.840 7.839 8.567 2006 8.652 11.572 10.568 7.442 7.414 
1984 11.268 11.130 8.638 8.063 8.717 2007 9.055 11.809 10.157 7.855 7.829 
1985 11.236 11.171 8.546 7.943 8.556 2008 9.215 11.789 9.551 7.746 7.734 
1986 11.272 11.271 8.422 8.001 8.595 2009 9.289 11.675 9.444 7.771 7.712 
1987 11.143 11.341 7.885 7.945 8.527 2010 9.429 11.616 9.440 7.665 7.639 
1988 11.077 11.314 9.061 7.815 8.325 2011 9.354 11.364 9.417 7.353 7.280 
1989 10.964 11.313 9.512 7.947 8.564 2012 9.007 11.372 9.008 7.160 6.976 
1990 10.880 11.054 9.611 7.755 8.322 2013 8.752 11.633 9.027 7.203 6.953 
1991 10.116 10.286 12.017 7.688 8.317 2014 9.208 11.429 8.378 7.096 6.880 
1992 9.671 10.632 12.219 7.889 8.371 Median 9.671 10.632 12.219 7.889 8.371 
 
Here it will be pertinent to note that the Gini coefficient is like the coefficient of variation (CV), the 
expected distance with respect to arithmetic mean. In case of the Coeff. of Variation (CV) the 
distance is Euclidean while in case of the Gini coefficient the distance is absolute. Stated explicitly, 
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is not so fast decreasing. This has been shown in Fig-3 (Table-9). It may 
be seen that fall in D started only since 1998 and its magnitude is not very different than what it was 
about 1976 or so. Furthermore, in social dimension of globalization much significant decline has not 
been there, while in political dimension there was a steep rise during 1988-1993, followed by a fast 
decline after 1994, trailing the dissolution of the USSR. As to the economic globalization, it started 
faltering after 2006 onwards. 
 
9. Relationship of AEMC and KOF indices of globalization with other socio-economic  indices: Now 
let us look into the association of globalization with some important socio-economic indicators 
(Table-10). These indicators are as follows. 
(i). Economic Freedom Index: Economists have always argued that freedom of individuals to pursue 
their self-interest results into the social good and therefore economic development. In constructing 
this index (EFI) property rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, lesser govt. spending, 
business freedom, monetary freedom, labour freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom and 
financial freedom are accounted for. It is obvious that such freedom is congenial to globalization. 
Indeed we find that globalization indices are highly correlated with the index of economic freedom 
(Table-11 and Table-12). 
(ii). International Innovation Index (INV): This is a global index measuring the level of innovation of a 
country, considering the business outcomes of innovation and government's ability to encourage 
and support innovation through public policy. It is expected that this index should be positively 
correlated with the index of globalization. Indeed we find that it is so (Table-11 and Table-12).  
(iii). Social Progress Index: measures the extent to which countries provide for the social and 
environmental needs of their citizens. The index is based on a large number of indicators in the areas 
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of basic human needs, foundations of well-being and opportunity to progress.  This index (SPI) is 
strongly and positively correlated with the index of globalization (Table-11 and Table-12). 
  
 Table-10. Globalization Indices and Some Other Important Socio-economic Indices 
Country KOF AEMC EFI INV SPI HDI CPI DEMI GGP 
Singapore 88.27 88.27 87.8 2.45 60 0.925 84 6.38 0.712 
Cyprus 86.045 87.32 67.9 0.63 77.45 0.856 55 7.65 0.684 
Israel 80.092 78.15 70.5 1.36 72.6 0.899 64 7.85 0.719 
Qatar 79.19 78.49 70.8 0.52 60 0.856 61 3.18 0.643 
Malaysia 77.385 79.12 70.8 1.12 69.55 0.789 49 6.54 0.666 
Jordan 72.86 70.17 69.3 -0.15 63.31 0.741 48 3.96 0.603 
Lebanon 71.168 70.5 59.3 - 61.85 0.763 28 4.86 0.598 
Turkey 70.662 71.33 63.2 -0.21 66.24 0.767 41 5.04 0.623 
Kuwait 70.345 70.99 62.5 0.06 69.19 0.8 41 3.85 0.624 
Bahrain 70.322 67.85 73.4 0.21 57 0.824 43 2.79 0.615 
Japan 70.159 72.26 73.3 1.79 83.15 0.903 72 7.99 0.66 
Saudi_Arabia 70.132 62.5 62.1 -0.12 64.27 0.847 46 1.93 0.583 
Thailand 67.57 72.06 62.4 0.12 66.34 0.74 35 4.92 0.699 
Brunei 67.204 67.6 68.9 - - 0.865 58 - 0.669 
Korea_Rep. 66.915 67.03 71.5 2.26 77.7 0.901 53 7.92 0.649 
Russian_Fed. 65.271 68.88 52.1 -0.09 63.64 0.804 29 3.24 0.691 
Georgia 62.732 64.21 73 -0.75 65.89 0.769 57 5.93 0.681 
Oman 61.327 62.66 66.7 -0.15 70 0.796 45 3.04 0.612 
Indonesia 60.547 59.65 58.1 -0.57 60.47 0.689 37 6.97 0.682 
Armenia 59.72 58.89 67.1 -0.66 65.7 0.743 33 3.88 0.669 
Kazakhstan 59.671 58.97 63.3 -0.23 61.38 0.794 29 3.06 0.718 
Philippines 59.475 59.2 62.2 -0.15 65.46 0.682 35 6.94 0.786 
China 57.468 62.02 52.7 0.73 59.07 0.738 40 3.14 0.676 
Kyrgyzstan 54.827 55.79 61.3 -0.77 58.58 0.664 28 4.93 0.687 
Mongolia 54.782 56.91 59.2 -0.89 61.52 0.735 38 6.62 0.705 
Azerbaijan 53.845 57.5 61 -0.54 62.62 0.759 30 2.65 0.684 
Pakistan 53.502 50.65 55.6 -0.82 45.66 0.55 32 4.33 0.556 
SriLanka 52.515 52.6 58.6 -0.56 60.1 0.766 36 6.48 0.673 
India 52.265 52.38 54.6 0.06 53.06 0.624 40 7.81 0.683 
Vietnam 51.421 56.69 51.7 -0.65 55 0.683 33 3.38 0.7 
Cambodia 50.984 50.69 57.5 - 53.96 0.563 21 4.27 0.658 
United_Arab 49.794 48.93 72.4 - 72.79 0.536 66 2.75 0.639 
Yemen 48.554 46.15 53.7 - 40.3 0.482 14 2.07 0.516 
Tajikistan 45.553 45.26 52.7 -0.99 56.49 0.627 25 1.89 0.679 
Bangladesh 45.123 42.43 53.9 - 53.39 0.579 26 5.73 0.698 
Bhutan 44.963 43.58 57.4 - 60 0.607 65 4.93 0.642 
Iran 40.79 42.35 41.8 - 56.82 0.774 29 2.34 0.587 
Nepal 40.365 38.18 51.3 -1.05 55.33 0.558 29 4.86 0.661 
Myanmar 37.293 39.03 46.9 - 46.12 0.556 28 4.2 - 
Sources:  
CPI (2016) :     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_Perceptions_Index  
HDI (2015) :    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index 
EFI  (2014) :    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Index_of_Economic_Freedom 
DEMI (2016):  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index 
SPI  (2015) :    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Progress_Index 
INV (2009) :  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Innovation_Index 
GGP (2016) : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Gender_Gap_Report#WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Index_rankings 
 
(iv). Human Development Index: It is a well-known index (HDI) that measures a country’s 
achievement on  life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators. AEMC and KOF 
globalization indexes are strongly and positively correlated with the HDI (Table-11 and Table-12). 
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(v). Corruption Perception Index: Corruption discourages inflow of capital. It impedes economic 
functions either by delays or by increasing the cost. It introduces several types of system-made risks 
and resistances. Transparency International  publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)  - 
score and ranking of countries  -  by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. The CPI generally defines corruption as "the misuse of public 
power for private benefit". The values of this index lie between 0 and 100; higher for less corrupt 
and lower for more corrupt. Kendall’s tau between AEMC index and CPI is 0.4493 and that between 
KOF index and CPI is 0.4547 (Table-11 and Table-12). The corresponding values for Spearman’s Rho 
are 0.5835 and 0.5939. Thus, less corrupt countries are more globalized. 
Table-11. Kendall’s Tau of AEMC and KOF indices of globalization with other socio-economic  indices   
 
Globalization Indices Other Socio-Economic Indices 
Indices KOF AEMC EFI INV SPI HDI CPI DEMI GGP 
KOF 1.0000 0.8758 0.5527 0.6213 0.5018 0.6077 0.4547 0.2236 0.0869 
AEMC 0.8758 1.0000 0.5770 0.5566 0.4619 0.5969 0.4493 0.2066 0.0100 
EFI 0.5527 0.5770 1.0000 0.4560 0.5339 0.4949 0.5617 0.1869 -0.0014 
INV 0.6213 0.5566 0.4560 1.0000 0.3792 0.5965 0.5495 0.1871 0.0139 
SPI 0.5018 0.4619 0.5339 0.3792 1.0000 0.4950 0.4648 0.2198 0.0572 
HDI 0.6077 0.5969 0.4949 0.5965 0.4950 1.0000 0.4673 0.1140 0.0428 
CPI 0.4547 0.4493 0.5617 0.5495 0.4648 0.4673 1.0000 0.2473 -0.0345 
DEMI 0.2236 0.2066 0.1869 0.1871 0.2198 0.1140 0.2473 1.0000 0.2904 
GGP 0.0869 0.0100 -0.0014 0.0139 0.0572 0.0428 -0.0345 0.2904 1.0000 
CPI = Corruption Perception Index; HDI = Human Development Index; EFI = Economic Freedom Index; DEMI = Democracy Index;  
SPI = Social Progress Index; INV =International Innovation Index;  GGP = Gender Gap Index. 
. 
Table-12. Spearman’s Rho of AEMC and KOF indices of globalization with other socio-economic  indices   
 
Globalization Indices Other Socio-Economic Indices 
Indices KOF AEMC EFI INV SPI HDI CPI DEMI GGP 
KOF 1.0000 0.9753 0.7116 0.7953 0.6701 0.7915 0.5939 0.3148 0.1112 
AEMC 0.9753 1.0000 0.7400 0.7301 0.6347 0.7840 0.5835 0.2884 0.0253 
EFI 0.7116 0.7400 1.0000 0.5862 0.6898 0.6316 0.7423 0.2734 -0.0080 
INV 0.7953 0.7301 0.5862 1.0000 0.4840 0.7427 0.7172 0.2914 -0.0076 
SPI 0.6701 0.6347 0.6898 0.4840 1.0000 0.6147 0.6246 0.3026 0.0659 
HDI 0.7915 0.7840 0.6316 0.7427 0.6147 1.0000 0.5834 0.1743 0.0602 
CPI 0.5939 0.5835 0.7423 0.7172 0.6246 0.5834 1.0000 0.3572 -0.0393 
DEMI 0.3148 0.2884 0.2734 0.2914 0.3026 0.1743 0.3572 1.0000 0.4207 
GGP 0.1112 0.0253 -0.0080 -0.0076 0.0659 0.0602 -0.0393 0.4207 1.0000 
CPI = Corruption Perception Index; HDI = Human Development Index; EFI = Economic Freedom Index; DEMI = Democracy 
Index; SPI = Social Progress Index; INV =International Innovation Index;  GGP = Gender Gap Index. 
 
 (vi). Democracy Index (DEMI): This index is based on a large number of indicators grouped in five 
different categories measuring pluralism, civil liberties and political culture.  In addition to giving 
score and ranking the countries accordingly, this index categorises the countries into four categories 
namely full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. It may be 
noted that democracies (full or flawed) and authoritarianism can both go in for or against 
globalization depending on many socio-economic and political considerations. There have been plus 
points as well as minus points with globalization that governments have to weigh since the political 
parties in opposition and the press bring them to the public view. A reference to Lee thesis may also 
be made which hypothesizes that democracy hurts economic growth and development. Knutsen 
(2010) finds that there is no significant, average effect of democracy on growth, possibly due to 
nonlinearity that may give the relationship a U shape (Libman, 2008). It is likely, therefore, that the 
relationship of globalization indices may not be as strong with DEMI as with other indicators that are 
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closely connected with economic development. We find weak positive relationship (although 
statistically significant) with the indices of globalization and DEMI.  
(vii). Gender Gap index (GGP):  This index summarizes equality in economic participation and 
outcomes, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment of women vis-à-
vis those of men. We find that this index has very poor or no relationship not only with globalization 
indices but also with other indices such as CPI, HDI, EFI, SPI, INV. Democracy Index (DMI) only has a 
considerable positive association (Spearman’s Rho = 0.4207, see Table-12) with GGP.   
 
Overall, we find that economic indicators (EFI, SPI and INV) and socio-economic indicators (HDI and 
CPI) are more strongly correlated with globalization index while political indicator (DEMI) and gender 
equality indicator (GGP) are weakly associated with the globalization index. 
10. Concluding remarks: In this study we have constructed a composite index of globalization of 
Asian countries during 1970-2014 by minimizing the Euclidean norm of Shapley values of indicator 
variables contributing to the overall index. As a consequence, the mean expected marginal 
contributions of constituent variable to the overall index are approximately equal and thus, the 
overall composite index represents the constituent variables optimally. We call this index the Almost 
Equal Marginal Contribution (AEMC) index. We compare this index with the KOF index of 
globalization and find that they are highly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.982).  We find that Singapore, 
Cyprus, Israel, Qatar, Malaysia, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain and Japan have done very 
well and scored above 0.7. At the other end, Yemen, Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, Nepal and 
Myanmar have scored only below 0.5. Trends in globalization are increasing in general, but the rate 
of globalization, which accelerated after 1991, lost is momentum after 2007. Disparities in 
globalization, as measured by Gini coefficient over the Asian countries, were more or less constant 
up to 1985 but after that they started declining.   
We have found that the index of globalization fares well with other socio-economic measures such 
as Economic Freedom Index, International Innovation Index, Social Progress Index, Human 
Development Index and Corruption Perception Index, showing high values of Kendall’s Tau and 
Spearman’s Rho. Its association with Democracy Index is rather weak but positive. It is almost 
uncorrelated with the Gender Gap Index. We observe, therefore, that globalization index is moving 
well with the indices of socio-economic condition in the Asian countries.  
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